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ABSTRACT: From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in skeptical discussions concerning 
knowledge of the existence, state, and standing of other minds. The analogical move from self to 
other unfolds as controversy. This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation predicament and 
examines analogy as an opening to the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition is identified 
as a productive process coming to terms with an other through testing sustainable error. The paper 
explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized by Aristotle’s virtue ethics in the polis. Moral hazard is 
identified as a threat to modern argument communities. 
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OSSA is a delightful conference. I have attended over the years and participated in a 
broad range of discussions. Argumentation itself appears continuously under 
convivial review. We seem to agree that reasons are important. On other items, 
consensus eludes. Differences persists over argumentation as an ontological feature 
of the human condition, an anchor for epistemic systems, an expression of practical 
knowledge, an outcome of linguistically constituted rules, and relational grounds for 
initiating and maintaining critical communication. The range of discussion crosses 
disciplines, generates new enthusiasms, motivates connections, and engages us in 
major projects of informal logic, gender, critical thinking, aesthetics pragma-
dialectics, linguistics, commitment, advocacy, controversy, cognition, AI and more. 
Our critical-cosmopolitan, global project flourishes. I appreciate the energy, 
foresight, and thinking of my colleagues, and am always intrigued by the new things 
afoot.  
 The temptation arises to pose the question: how may argumentation study 
address the global circumstances of the 21st century? This question touches my own 
line of work: critical argumentation studies. Such inquiry visits controversies of the 
past to extrapolate similarities and interpolate differences into the present. 
Giambattista Vico’s Rhetoric is my favorite collection of notes because it situates 
argument as advocacy in civil society, setting the grounds for the New Science which 
discovers change in the expressions of mind that yield an age. In the long 18th 
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century, Vico provided an alternative to Descartes’ dualism. The professor of the 
rhetorical arts situates mind in practical training, the colors of tropes, and the 
ingenuity of address deployed to negotiate the circumstances of a time (Hampshire, 
1969, pp. 475-495). In the 21st century, globalization challenges us, similarly, to 
extend abstract models in concrete ways. At its core, I agree that argumentation 
studies address predicaments, such as a core concern of “having to combine 
effectiveness and reasonableness” (Goodnight, 2003; van Eemeren, 2010, p. 40). In 
contemporary world, predicaments expand and multiply across contexts. 
Argumentation works to address multicultural engagements, network connections, 
(post)modern institutions, and new media (Goodnight, 2003). The very rules 
presupposed in everyday practices have turned reflexive. Thus, in affirming, 
developing or veering from new contexts, communities of argument undergo a 
range of corrections, repairs, and innovations--as the rules of reason are turned 
back upon themselves by self-authorized questioning. In this address, I do not offer 
a new model of argument; but, I do want to extend an invitation for lateral thinking 
across contemporary contexts. In this respect, I work through varied topics but 
return to a central question: How can the problem of other minds be posed anew to 
engage the virtues of argument in a time of global change?  
The problem of other minds is a philosophical debate that I address with 
some hesitation. Paul Noordhof informs us that “the issues which lie at the heart of 
discussions I philosophy of mind have not changed and are unlikely to change in the 
near future, or even, I hazard a guess, the quite distant future” 2011, p. 239). The 
controversy defines a robust line of practice laid down within the modern field of 
philosophy. Its stakes could not be higher. Should we not be able to establish the 
existence of other minds or secure knowledge of their content, we risk…solipsism. 
Boxed into a corner by un-perspicuous reasoning, I may leave you with the 
alienating conclusion: “I am the only mind which exists” or “The mental states of 
others are unknowable to me—or anyone else.” Theodore Everett (2000, 213) 
tantalizes, dangling the ugly outcome: “As far as each us can tell subjectively, after 
all, he might be a proverbial brain in a vat, being fed his subjective experiences 
through a set of wires.” A demon may be dreaming this whole operation.  
Yet, despite this stated anxiety, I have found that philosophers confidently 
engage in technical exchanges that parse whether, how and to what extent we can 
claim to know the other as we know our self. These elaborate exchanges are not 
infrequently accompanied by conciliation, like the following: We know there are 
other minds. We behave as if we do all the time. Yet, we may overstate the grounds 
for our certainty. The asymmetry of access--to one’s own thoughts as privileged 
versus those of others, that may or may not be different--cautions skeptical reserve. 
Address of this “ego-predicament” has touched philosophical controversies over 
mind, brain, consciousness, awareness, perception, behavior and alteriority itself.  
I wish to strategically resituate the initial formulation of the problem: 
particularly in relation to its often proposed solution, the argument from analogy. In 
brief, I see the argument from analogy as the camel’s nose under the tent, opening 
the way to knowledge of other minds through acts of rhetorical cognition. Aristotle’s 
virtue argument builds a model where indirect, collaborative thinking flourishes in 
excellence through cultivating good cognitive habits that connect action to 
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judgment. I conclude that virtue argument is limited by aspects of our contemporary 
post-polis pluralistic culture, even though—oddly enough--moral hazard appears to 
be nearly universal.  
 
2. THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS AND ANALOGY  
 
The problem of other minds goes back to Descartes mind body dualism. It was put in 
its modern version by Thomas Reid. Skepticism notwithstanding, he argues, 
“common sense” secures our sense of others. Common sense insists that: “(i) 
Everything of which I am conscious exists. (ii)The thoughts of which I am conscious 
are the thoughts of a being I call ‘myself’, my ‘mind’ or my ‘person’. (iii) Those things 
that I distinctly remember did really occur. (iv) Those things that I distinctly 
perceive by my sense do really exist and are as I perceive them to be. (v) There is life 
and intelligence in our fellow[s] … with whom we converse.” (vi) “Certain features of 
the countenance, sounds of the voice and gestures of the body, indicate certain 
thoughts and dispositions of mind.” (vii) Finally, “there is a certain regard due to 
human testimony in matters of fact” (Avramides, 2001, p. 88). Common sense 
promises security in understanding one’s own mind and does furnishes tools to read 
others; just not consistently nor all the time. 
John Stuart Mill did not take common sense for granted. He posed the basic 
question: “By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to 
believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking 
figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, 
possess Minds?” Mill secures his knowledge in the fact that others have “bodies like 
me” and “exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I know by 
experience to be caused by feelings.” He deduces that there must be a mediating 
feature between feelings induced in response to an environment and behaviors that 
express reception. He knows that his mind mediates for him. Thus, “I bring other 
human beings, as phenomena, under the same generalizations which I know by 
experience to be the true theory of my own existence” (1872, pp. 243-244). 
The result of this argument for the existence and knowledge of others 
constitutes an offer to resolve an epistemological problem concerned with justifying 
“beliefs about mental states other than our own” and a conceptual issue: “how is it 
possible to form a concept of mental states other than our own?” (Other Minds, 
2009). The problems persist because of the acceptance of a fundamental asymmetry 
between knowledge of one’s own mind and that of others. Whereas justification to 
know one’s own thinking can be verified by more or less direct evidence that is 
internal and so privileged, claims to know the thinking of the others do not have 
similar access and therefore (assuming accurate knowledge of one’s own mind) is in 
principle less trustworthy, if it is given any credence at all. Sayward defends Mill’s 
problem as genuine: “While it is obvious to us that other people feel pain, we do not 
see how we know this”; hence, “skepticism is the affirmation that the problem of 
other minds is a real problem and the denial that there is any solution” (2003, p. 
317). 
The analogical argument extending one’s own thinking to others is weak 
because it cannot be checked. The inference drawn is indirect. Further, the analogy 
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is “based on a single instance. Philosophers argue that the conclusion cannot be 
checked directly” (Stanford Encyclopedia) When the analogy is treated as conducive 
to tests of inductive reasoning, comparing a case of one against another does not 
martial sufficient proof. A. J. Ayer (1946) supports analogy by pointing out that 
judgment of others can be established by multiplicative corroboration. The 
inference appears more robust, but interlacing signs of behavior to judge a state 
does not ground the act of comparison itself 
Analogy and its sibling rivals contest across the journals. Norman Malcolm 
holds that an analogy would not be necessary should Mill have a criteria to 
distinguish other minds, but this begs the question. Thomas Olshewsky concedes 
there is no justification but that analogy follows a path of discovery, which 
argumentation per se does not; but this stipulates an arbitrary function for 
argument, rather than determining its validity conditions by relations to audiences 
A. Hyslop and F. C. Jackson defend analogical argument as not requiring 
independent confirmation, just as the present is like the past, so is my mind like 
yours. Neither statement is verifiable strictly, but both are regarded as structured 
inferences, a matter of confirmation not verification (Fiegel, 1958, p. 985). Finally, 
Stemmer asserts that the problem can be resolved by judging the actions of others 
in reference to my own is the best criteria, thereby avoiding analogy altogether—
but begging the question by shifting to a covert simile (1987, p. 109). Most recently, 
the whole issue has moved into the realm of technical analysis that moves from 
explication of the basic premises, extension, conclusion and counterclaims. Don 
Locke concludes that the argument from analogy is now dismissed “with an airy 
wave of the hand” (Locke, 1973, p. 153). Nevertheless, the debate persists and the 
issue remains open. 
I propose to shift the problem of other minds. As it has unfolded, the problem 
invites doubt over whether a concept and knowledge of the other can be confirmed 
through checking. The discussion follows a problem-solution schema. What if the 
problem was a predicament? A predicament challenges an arguer to invent grounds 
for valid judgment in the face of uncertainty, made less easily resolved by competing 
communicative validity claims. Scientific, moral, ethical, personal, and discursive 
validity claims depend upon the ability of communicative reason to withstand 
appropriate objection (Habermas, 1983). Neuroscience tells us these days that we 
anticipate and respond to others before our conscious minds know what we or they 
intend. Mimicry is geared by our brain as perception connects through mirror 
neurons with motor apparatus of the body. One’s sizes up the other before reasons 
are fully formed, even though subsequently one typically edits responses to 
selectively engage, tentatively explore and check the standing of one’s own reaction 
(Franks 2010). Communication in everyday practices routinizes, integrates, and 
habituates engagement with others. Habits vary, but urban environments reward 
efficient communication. Common sense is shaped by confident alertness to the 
needs of self as expressed in relation to others while circulating through the day. 
The flow is disrupted when the projected grounds of valid address that underwrite 
communication in context are not granted (by oneself and/or an other), then 
brought into question by the turn to argue. What constitutes the make-up of such 
threshold moments? 
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3. THE TURN TO ARGUE 
 
The turn to argue (to become argumentative) disrupts efficient exchange of 
activities. Arguing backs us up, exposes risks, and creates uncertainties—rendering 
evident something of the otherness of other minds. We don’t agree or unexpectedly 
discover that we do—and would rather not. As a preventing measure, common 
sense discounts the need to argue by the attribution of reasonable difference. If 
agreement cannot be reached, there are many possible causes one might attribute to 
the other: ignorance, stubbornness, bad faith, or blind indifference. These 
rationalizations not-withstanding, it is possible to admit that failure to agree may be 
justified. In the worlds of personal preference, professional practice, or public life, 
each of us has an idea of “reasonable” difference. There is always more that “one 
way to skin a cat” the saying goes. Different people choose different means, weight 
ends peculiar to their own experiences, and hold some actions within bounds and 
others not. Thus, one may support a claim as sound, even true, but recognize 
reasonable differences in its acceptability. This county values motor cycle helmets; 
that one does not. We do not carry handguns; they are packing. You say potato, I say 
potato. One’s own common sense can be secured when disagreement is noticed--
even when that which is common appears only to be reasonable difference. 
Reasonable differences cannot be sustained--when disagreement can no longer be 
overlooked, or when there are benefits for aligning common support for different 
reasons. 
Other minds sometimes rupture the efficient transmission of communication 
and the means of discounting differences. Communication does rationalize routine 
with efficient, pragmatic re-enforcement. Rules of engagement are lodged in the 
customs of families, the habits of manners, the codes of the profession, the genre of 
composition, the schemas of practice or the traditions of public forums. 
Communication is reasonable because reciprocal expectations of what it means to 
assert and to differ are routinely met. These are confirmed by a more or less stable 
range of social and professional practices, certified by contract, and enforced by rule 
of law. The quality of an other mind comes in play when predicaments begin to 
multiply: communication is urgent, differences can no longer be discounted, repairs 
become entangled in the rupture, but claims (and the means of resolving them) 
remain urgent and contested. Sometimes the variation is subtle: a shift of topic, a 
failure to make an objection, or an unexpectedly strong backing of a weak claim—
anything amiss may alert us as to a fundamental gap between one’s own thinking 
and that of an other. When the difference can no longer be overlooked, the problem 
of other minds reveals itself as predicament.  
Argument models often take the-turn-to-argue as a given. In conversation or 
dialogue, argument begins at the point of a claim made that encounters doubt. 
Aristotle holds that the architecture of an argument must be made with sound plans, 
good materials, competent work, and a good purpose. Under pain of relevance, 
contention is recognized only as an architectonic test of a well-built claim. Yet, 
engagement in disagreement itself is not so limited, each turn to argue carries with 
it risks and possibilities in the address of other minds. The turn to argue ranges 
from vociferous opposition to quiet demurral. The turn disrupts the informal flow of 
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one’s own thinking or punctures the flow of communication between us. The turn 
may be spontaneous or result from a decision well-strategized.  
The social turn to argument has risks that a private thought may not. 
Communication becomes messy. Doubts may rise that are not expressible, 
articulation of reasons may take their own time, reasons apparently secure may lose 
standing or status. Even stable structures of reason are susceptible to the turn. 
Social norms both encourage and discourage disagreement; decisions carry forward 
with authority but remain open to scrutiny; the costs of disagreement earns one a 
reputation for being quarrelsome, but with self-imposed silencing one becomes a 
yes man. The turn to argue situates self and other in a social situation where the 
virtues of reason are uncertain in relation to the consequences of action.  
Giambattista Vico the great opponent of Descartes introduced his generation 
of students to the turn to argue. In contrast to skeptical undoing of social knowledge 
and a resulting mind-body dualism, Vico prefers to ground thought in the language 
of a time. Reason is a situated capacity to respond to others at an occasion. Human 
thinking is ensconced within forms of discourse and unfolds in mindful patterns 
(1996). Vico’s grounded position of argument reminds us that the access to reasons 
and risks taken in address are not identical for every party in a dispute: defendant, 
prosecutor, defense, judge onlookers. Roles position and differentiate risks. The 
dignity of the participants stressed by the gravity of the subject influence the 
cognitive structures of argumentation. The institutional positioning of reasons in 
relation to the community is important, substituting rule of law for blood feuds and 
vengeance. Violence caps reason still in many parts of the world. The turn to argue 
itself cannot be taken for granted.  
 Even in a peaceful, commercial, pluralistic, democratic society, the turn to 
argue is not without risks. The hazards associated with the turn to challenge 
standing authority with new possibility comprises how we develop and revise 
standards for social customs as well as state of the art practices within modern 
fields. Situated risk provides a route to engage and assess how knowledge of other 
minds is put into play by argument. Three areas illustrate alternative risks. 
 
3.1 Personal argument 
 
In a personal relationship, contestation over a claim may be read as a sign of 
disrespect over judgment; yet, to avoid argument altogether, to forestall open 
disagreement, may result in baroque maneuvers to avoid topics, discussions, and 
direct address. Relationships grow cold. Bertrand Russell positions skepticism, 
claiming that a philosopher might pretend to know only a priori abstracts of time 
and space but once he gets cross with his spouse “you will see that he does not 
regard” the other “as a mere spatio-temporal edifice of which he knows the logical 
properties but not a glimmer of the intrinsic character.” “We are therefore justified 
in inferring that his skepticism is professional rather than sincere,” he concludes 
(1970, p. 3). Russell reminds us obliquely that common sense regard of the other is 
shaped by gender conventions, as is perhaps the problem of other minds itself. 
Generally, from the point of view of identity, the basic predicament of 
argumentation becomes doing justice to both relevance and salience. There are risks 
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to bracketing identity as only marginally relevant while addressing the situated 
salience of a claim, as well as the reverse. 
 
3.2 Institutional logic 
 
In an institutional role, the turn to argue is fraught with risks to status, face, and 
reputation. On the one side, questioning, challenging, reviewing past mistakes or 
anticipating future hazards, may be distill an impression of a quarrelsome chap who 
is more interested in getting things right than in getting them done. From the 
standpoint of a decision-maker, the offer of input from diverse views may 
strengthen debate among subordinates, which heightens dissension in carrying out 
a decision, thereby perpetuating partisan rivalry. On the other hand, demanding 
consensus may result in “group-think” that makes a decision-maker vulnerable to 
well-cooked conclusions from cherry-picked evidence. Practice has risks whether 
the argumentative turn be encouraged as dialogue, debate or discussion. 
 
3.3 Social standing and change  
 
The question of who can argue, under what circumstances, with what limits to time 
and resources has synchronic and diachronic possibilities for study. A society is 
known for its exceptions to those who are deemed beyond self-representation, in 
need for further development, or have limited to access to varied forums. So, too, the 
turn to argument persists over times as reason is attributed as standing for certain 
groups and denied as savagery for others, rulers and ruled. The turn to argue offers 
a window into the configuration of power relationships, where the force of the 
better argument differentiates out groups over time. Counter-argument may fuel 
emancipatory movements that oppose systems that protect the communicative 
rights of some to open, reasoned exchange, while denying the same status to others 
who are deemed incapable of self-determination. 
The problem of other minds re-conceptualized speaks to a predicament 
between common sense and the turn to argue. Analogy offers one such turn, a 
meeting point between minds where expectations can be reasonably projected and 
differences reasonably repaired through reflexive exchange. Note importantly, 
though, that analogy is only one among a number of a large range of tropes, each of 
which figures meeting points between minds in varied ways. Other figures could be 
used to similar ends, putting into play language-games which the other is invited to 
play along. Rhetorical cognition is the indirect knowledge gained about US as we put 
some issues into play, not others; figure authority or flatten it; build up or release 
emotion. The power of tropes to yield knowledge of other minds comes in how the 
conversation turns out to focus, extend, or cut short common play of inquiry.  
 
4. RHETORICAL COGNITION AND THE VIRTUES OF REASON 
 
The problem of other minds offers a predicament for communication; the question 
of other minds remain problematic not because evidence cannot be attained from 
penetrating the physical interiority of the brain; rather, the problem persists due to 
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the asymmetry between claims to determine one’s own mind and the imperfect 
projections in reading and responding, correcting and build upon the reasons of 
others. Although it is likely that one doesn’t know one’s mind as completely as one 
thinks (given most of our brain activities are below conscious levels), it is certainly 
the case that in modern societies the other has a right of first refusal to claims of 
existence and standing. In that respect, communication is not reducible to an 
exchange of information that can be converted to taken-for-granted interactions; 
rather, communication depends upon an asymmetry where the assertion of 
meanings about (1) the ontological standing of the other or (2) the state of mind 
outside one’s own may always, in principle, can be countered with refusal. If mirror 
neurons do indeed trigger basic awareness of the other, then the motor apparatus of 
our brains respond to perception; however, despite direct stimuli of anticipatory 
action, claims to “know” the other can only be secured through indirect testing, that 
is symbolic or linguistic exchange. In this respect, resolution of the problem of other 
minds remains understandably a goad to philosophical speculation; but 
reformulated, the predicament does not so much frustrate as invite reflection on the 
turns to argue. 
The argumentative turn has political and ethical risks that impact the 
development of one’s character, the classics remind us. Preferences breed 
reputation. An assertive style utters direct claims, pronounces forceful truths, 
asserts aggressive judgments, and repels criticism vigorously. Those given to a 
thoughtful style employ indirection, suggestion, skeptical undoing, and balance 
dissoi-logoi into ataraxic withdrawal. Personal character grounds the habits 
developed as one grows into practices of communication, Aristotle found. Vico 
believes that the great orator is so rare because personal qualities are differentially 
distributed and to work on, say, memory is to give up on another, like ingenuity 
(1996, p. 19). The community benefits from thoughtful arguers whose quality of 
mind in relation to action makes public the most timely, forceful arguments inviting 
judgment on behalf of the common good. Considered arguments generate thoughtful 
publics, good publics invite good argument. 
Aristotle understood this unfinished space as he explained the human 
bipedal occupation of its unique ecological niche, the polis. The enthymeme offers a 
participatory form where an arguer invites an audience to fill in evidence or a 
conclusion. Such collaborative cognitive work creates a consensus by arguing one’s 
own ideas in a way so as to extend inferences of others, with the aim of rendering an 
informed decision regarding action. The work is critical, too, because a claim to act 
is always at best probable and succeeds only when it describes conduct in ways that 
avoid temptations to excess or to deficiency. Just as one grows in capacities for 
personal judgment through good habits of thinking, so too a public flourishes when 
its citizens are invited to test the cogency of topics. Argument entwines authority, 
emotion and reason into association for considered judgment. Aristotle’s own 
system is often regarded as telic. Hence, argument is reduced to an instrument or 
tool of persuasion. What is overlooked in this simplification is it’s the dependence of 
rhetoric on inference, indirection that releases energy and feeds the dynamics of 
productive thinking taking topics through invention, reasons, and circumstance. 
Tom Farrell (1995) read Aristotle’s rhetoric as an invitation to think together and in 
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making arguments to know ourselves as a community which is likely what he meant 
when he would use the term rhetorical cognition. 
The present return of the popularity of virtue argumentation is found in the 
promise of the cognitive development of agency, the success of communities of 
practices, the flourishing of institutions hinges upon participatory enactment of 
argument in a mindful way that consistently anticipates, reviews, poses and resolves 
problems in the particular case; and, conversely from the imperfect resolution of 
cases the strengths and weaknesses of practice can be better understood. The 
virtues of argument appreciate the qualities of mind that are cultivated by engaged 
critical thinking. These qualities form habits for the individual. What is sometimes 
forgotten in understanding ethics and the development of agency is Aristole’s link to 
rhetoric as a practice. The habits of rhetorical cognition bring to bear questions of 
common judgment that put at risk the community.  
Aristotle’s idea of rhetoric offers a strong model of argument in shaping a 
flourishing cognitive capacity for a community of argument. Virtue ethics extend to 
argumentation offers a promising way to cultivate good practices. It has limits 
though, which make our own work with argumentation challenging. The difference 
between self and other is compounded with asymmetries of standing, introduced in 
different periods, but still with influence.  
 
4.1 Tradition and advocacy 
 
Aristotle’s polis treasured the virtue of argument as arête, excellence. 
Argumentation is not always seated in a virtue culture. Questions of Republic and 
Empire weigh the rules of reason by the duties of representation and the challenges 
of advocacy. The choice to participate or withdraw is weighted against with whom 
one argues and agrees as much as what is true or false, right or wrong.  
 
4.2 Modernity and expertise 
 
Specialized communities of practice now are organized by fields, which operate with 
quasi-autonomous allegiance to the pursuit of intellectual questions. Expertise 
engages in the sophisticated testing and adaptation of technology to coordinate 
reasoning for individual cases on a broadly co-oriented scale. Scientific argument 
remains fundamentally a creature of basic research but the social production of 
“institutional argumentation” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003) places “other 
minds” into role accountability and performance. Role based argument must 
construct its own others, as client. The shared habits of experts create a taken-for-
granted understanding of split address in and out groups. Exchange of reasons 
between client and expert add yet another level of asymmetry to argument. 
 
4.3 Postmodernity and identity 
 
Aristotle’s polis was the product of a slave culture that did not anticipate change. 
Strangers to the culture were barbarian whose contact was less frequent and 
threatening. We live in multi-cultural societies and exchange is carried by trade, 
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circulation of populations, and publics. The state and the nation pull in sometimes 
compatible and sometimes different ways for the participation of citizens. Some 
workers are citizens, others are not. The identity of the other cannot be unified as 
inside or outside the community 
 
5. ARGUMENT AND MORAL HAZARD  
 
What happens when the polis goes bad? Certainly, Aristotle had issues with tyrants 
in his own day. We need ask anew: How does argument fall into a weak or 
compromised state of practice? David Zarefsky (2011) reminds us that an argument 
culture rests on a community of practice; that such a community creates boundaries 
that define its interests, topics and activity types for securing judgment among 
relevant audiences. A community of practice flourishes when argument results in 
justified decisions that minimize error and maximize the chance of learning from 
mistakes. Just as Aristotle held that virtue ethics were necessary for an individual to 
reach an equilibrium in avoiding deficiency and excess, so we may examine a self-
sustaining practice that itself occupies a niche of practice successfully, and 
standardizes criteria for state of the decisions in questions of choice. Just as the 
individual thrives by discipline, so too, a community of practice thrives only when it 
avoids either acting precipitously on too little evidence or avoiding change in the 
face of evident necessity. When do communities of practice flourish? How do they 
weaken and ultimately fail? 
It must be admitted that sometimes strategic maneuvering goes wrong, 
terribly wrong. Why is the turn to argue sometimes foregone, vital elements banned, 
and flows of junk communication put in its stead? Argumentation goes on autopilot, 
generating discourses as if they were reasonable products of agents, but basically 
the discourse is a veneer for reasons that matter to no one in particular. Put, 
differently, when are the costs of making an argument outweighed by the incentives 
to remain altogether silent, to substitute wholly specious reasoning for what should 
be tested critically, or to defer genuine argument while interests proceed in quest 
for advantage basically without sustained opposition? An argument community can 
fail when state-of-the-art standards for critical-rational appraisal of communication 
are systematically undermined, corrupted and suborned.  
 Consider three examples of the weakening of argumentation through the 
creation of moral hazard. Moral hazard is an anxiety of 19th century insurance 
agencies that were expanding home owner policies (Baker, 1996). The provision of 
insurance was driven by the need to offset anxieties about future risk of harm. 
Insurance creates a moral hazard when it pays more for a policy holder to burn 
down his house than it does to endure the costs of a fire. So, too, moral hazard 
occurs in argumentation when either: a) it pays to voice partisan opposition, even 
though an argument is well supported or b) it pays not to object to an argument, 
even though one understands it to be much weaker than claimed or entirely false. 
Justification turns to rationalization when proving a correct, informed assessment of 
a claim is less important than maintaining its impending, or established, truth or 
falsity. Individuals can be taken in by persuasive appeals; critical thinking preserves 
and extends reasoning autonomy. The question I wish to address is what kind of 
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moral hazard can lead to the systematic undermining of rational autonomy in an 
institutional settings of people trained, empowered, and credentialed to know 
better. What happening when argumentation itself goes “bad”? 
 
4.1 Economics, markets and argument 
 
Economic regulation requires the ratings of bonds. Investment offerings have 
proven risks. Past returns on investment is used as an indicator of future 
expectations. Bond ratings were trusted as reliable indicators of the amount of risk. 
Two shifts occurred that changed this. First, investment banks and savings banks 
merged, providing a lot of capital seeking new investments. Derivatives pooled 
housing loans from different part of the countries and sold them as bonds that 
would benefit from the low rate of default and the rising prices of housing, 
encouraged by low interest rates. Investment firms bought mortgages and pooled 
risks, inducing banks to lower standards of proof and to seek more loan applicants. 
The bond rating agencies treated the derivative pools as if they were similar to 
other pools of home loans, not taking into account the variable risk factors 
calculated into the mix of high and lower risk home loans. Bond ratings failed to test 
the accuracy of representation, while home loan lenders encouraged 
misrepresentation by reversing presumption. Proof of credit was linked to rising 
home prices rather than ability to pay, through subprime loans. Meanwhile, the 
Federal Reserve abetted this new standard by failing to file fraud cases while at the 
same time barring states from passing their own standards for checking loans. The 
payoff for not checking arguments tightly was great, the advantages of stopping the 
game was great as well. The argument thus shifted from checking standards of 
representation to permissive analogy, a thinking that moved an institution from 
strong evidence to weak. Many within the finance and lending industry recognized 
the shift was not sustainable, but to work they had to meet their quotas and make 
the sales. Thus, moral hazard effects markets, an operation otherwise reputed for 
conservative standards, cautious behavior, and accounting for risk before reward 
(Cassidy, 2009; Lewis, 2010). 
 
4.2 Science argumentation 
 
The question of anthropogenic climate change is coming ever closer. Storms, 
droughts, ice melting added public salience to a controversy that has extended over 
the last several decades. For most of the controversy, the question of confined 
largely to a small but global scientific community. The community had positive 
influence with international conferences in Japan, reaching a consensus about 
carbon emissions as a human induced cause of climate change. The cause are clear, 
who should bear what portions of the costs were not. Recently, the Canadian 
government has been reluctant to allow scientific reports bearing on the climate 
issue to be accessed. Acceding to public outcry, response occurs but is slowed by the 
“bureaucratic fallacy”—delay, redaction and exception. Key political office and 
departments are exempted from the obligations to provide studies, those actually 
provided are extensively redacted, and personnel are always in short supply (Amber 
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2013). In the United States, climate deniers took pride in questioning the science 
and some took to religious inspired counterargument. Politicians engage in 
rhetorical excess, but the question of climate comes down to who bears the risks. 
Anticipating the rise of sea levels, insurance rates were due to go up for the North 
Carolina shores. The legislature would not stand for this, so they banned evidence 
on “sea rise” from debate on coastal policy. Democratic North Carolina Governor 
Bev Perdue faced the question of signing this monument to ignorance, and 
demurred. The failure of moral courage technically may not be a fallacy but it 
certainly undermines the character of a forum. Legislatively banning or 
bureaucratically retarding the consideration of evidence but encourages a fallacious 
climate of reasoning, and it certainly fortifies policy based upon ignorance. 
 
4.3 Networked argument 
 
The internet is a space that offers great access to ephemeral and enduring 
communities of argument. In the last decade, nonprofit firms have been transformed 
by greater public access. Science has slipped from its specialized boxes and appears 
in public discussions. Climate science sites invite argument where the norms of 
participating and debating scientific findings and implications for practice are 
discussed. The internet is also a space for moral hazards. The risks of engaging other 
minds have never been greater. Nonverbal cues are not present. Participation may 
or may not have or invite off line interaction. Platforms double-code 
communication, with little notice or control. Propaganda does not so much raise 
masses as spur mobs. The intent of an argument unwinds sentiment from audience, 
incidentally connected. Norms of exchange shared among one community are not 
shared by others; satire that confirms an open society becomes revised as a gesture 
of disrespect that offends another. Even as democratic participation widens, mass 
media seed popular opinion and imitate its loose commitment to evidence, 
precision, and judgment. Texts thin. Fragments multiply. Expectations hang. The 
tasks of informal logic have never been greater. Software that works on ‘relevance’ 
feeds us back our own opinion. The editor has died to make this all possible. Moral 
accomplishments are possible on the internet, but so too the risks of moral hazard. 
The flourishing of practical reason as new media literacy is necessary to realize that 
the problem of other minds persists and takes new form under networked 
communication.  
 
5. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STUDIES 
 
The problem of other minds persists because common sense tells us that there is an 
asymmetry between access to knowledge of one’s own state and access to 
information of the states of others. The diverse language games of a global society 
confirm this intuition anew in the multiple rules that invite ingenious engagement. 
Further, the question of other minds grows more pressing, as the indeterminacy of 
mind itself finds articulation: Michael Tooley (n.d.) asks: “Can one, or could one, for 
example, have justified beliefs (a) about other humans, both normal humans and 
humans at various stages of development, or decline? (b) About various non-human 
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animals? (c) About possible extra-terrestrials with a very different physiological 
makeup? (d) About super-computers?” Alterity can be posed as a question of 
differences brought about by condition, material, and scale. Yet, the otherness of an 
other mind may be discovered, too, merely in the mis-projection of reasonable 
expectations. Ideally such errors would invite cosmopolitan self-reflection on the 
assumed, grounded practices of argument, calling into appraisal common 
assumptions about rule standing, conditions of trust, and asymmetrical costs to 
expressing disagreement 
The problem is both conceptual and material, formed initially with the 
question: how can I appreciate an other’s pain. The peculiar quality of pain is that 
coping with it changes the brain so experiences of the self are not consistent; indeed, 
pain can remain even after the physiological cause weakens or no longer persists. 
The contemporary coordination of pain management involves an argumentative 
turn, the departure from the efficient exchange to an appreciation to talk with 
others who share similar interests., Subramaniam et al. (1999) found that most 
subject were relieved to shift discussion of pain from family members to experts and 
fellow sufferers who embraced a turn to the topic. The problem of other minds 
requires post-conventional appreciation of the reciprocal construction of mind and 
brain, the conceptual and material resources engaged in the act of turning to argue. 
The problem of other minds also requires understanding the consequences of acts 
of access for groups perhaps disbursed spatially but bound by common condition 
and imagined connections. 
Such a cosmopolitan project requires continuous work with the virtues of 
argument and the problem of other minds. The efforts I have in mind are 
collaborative, an engagement in lateral thinking, that extrapolates through critical 
appraisal of long-standing controversies and interpolates the possibilities of 
somewhat novel sequences building into alternative futures. To sum, five lines of 
inquiry are connected in this paper. 
 
5.1 Philosophical controversy 
 
The essay takes up inquiry into a traditional debate and subsequent developments 
from modern philosophy. I think that our community has reached a point where we 
may wish to do critical studies on philosophical argumentation as a practice. The 
idea is to address the beginnings of issues that are subject to contemporary 
technical debate and to see if they may be better solved by taking them down 
alternative paths. The palaces of positivism, although lately in ruins, continue to 
dazzle with interesting argumentation. It is of interest to see how the arguments 
may be recast in other ways. Is this always a good idea? The rhetorician’s view of the 
problem of other minds is well known. How can the gullible and weak-willed be 
persuaded? There are other, better ends, however strategic. Ingenuity is a virtue of 
argument that permits interlocutors to resolve an impasse, to raise or lower 
standards for coming to agreement, and to correct unshared mutual understanding, 
learning from mistakes. Philosophical controversy can be read for the ingenuity of 
philosophers addressing issues that otherwise get repeated and take on 
cumbersome visage. 
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5.2 Rhetorical cognition 
 
The play language games imparts indirect knowledge of other minds. So efficient is 
communication that sometimes this otherness becomes forgotten. Otherness is 
confirmed, however, when arguments are not easily discounted, resolved or set 
aside. Ingenuity must intervene. A reflexive turn occurs when routine is broken and 
reciprocal flow of expectations ruptured. The negative can be articulated as 
contention, objection, contestation, antagonism, mimicry and mocking; the routes of 
engaging an other mind may appear to be direct but reciprocal thinking is always 
carried along by language games playing within, through or out of a trope. Shifts in 
tropes that discipline a dispute may be helpful in creating new possibilities of 
understanding or agreement. The climate debate is in trouble because utilitarian 
logic deployed by evidentiary representations is too fearsome to even acknowledge 
basic evidence. Paradox offers better framing (Sorensen, 2003). Climate is the 
problem of the heap. When does humanity switch from just another day of more 
carbon into setting in motion irreversible long-term disaster? The paradox of how 
short and long term interest intersect with productive resistance could underwrite a 
different way of thinking about involvement in the issue. 
 
5.3 The turn to argue, for others 
 
Understanding the turn to argument can be figured as sometimes a dimple at other 
times a failure to anticipate properly or completely the thinking of others. Shared 
validity conditions set limits on the scope of a debate; speech acts presuppose 
shared rules of articulation and evaluation—in order to make sense. The rules 
projected for any given situation may be unshared, however. The trust necessary to 
create a bridge in which differences are discussed may not be available. Daniella 
Adams (2004) critiques speech act theory from the standpoint of group access. 
Since US Supreme Court’s Brown versus Board of Education the trust necessary to 
converse across lines of racial divide simply does not exist for many in the United 
States. The risks to coming to a consensus that is incorrect may be endurable for 
one, but not for others; open argument may be possible within a group, but not 
across groups with historically different social status. Seyla Benhabib (2006) speaks 
to the project of critical-cosmopolitanism where controversies erupt between 
advocates with different cultural perspectives, but the result is a learning moment 
or democratic iteration—such as the hijab debate in France. The turn to argue, to 
sustain, to expand or contract, or break off, perhaps then renew—all these entry and 
exit points mark argument as a reflexive turn focusing urgent inquiry on the taken 
for granted everyday arrangements of communication. Open discussion may create 
or renew appreciation for reasonable differences.  
 
5.4 Communities of practice 
 
Argument communities appear to flourish following structure-function models 
analogous to Aristotle’s polis. Judgment is cultivated at the juncture of ethical, 
political and rhetorical practice. The process flourishes when argument moderates 
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between extremes. Vico sees the practice of argument as pulled by gestures toward 
the dignity of the audience in its uncertain position when deciding the gravity of its 
own risks in relation to the outcome of a case. The social positions of arguers do not 
distribute risks equally, however; and procedural guarantees work within and 
against actual performance of argument. So, the standards of a field, the practices of 
trusted institutions, the standards by which argumentation is deployed to fulfill 
professional duties and public expectations can change. Moral hazard is a problem 
where repositioning of standards and proof in key exchanges may make a field 
flourish for a while, only to contribute to its crash in the long run. Such changes may 
aid an institution in avoiding tough evidence that its own practices and standards of 
judgment are questionable, but only for a time. Virtue ethics is necessary to remind 
us that just as our own character is shaped by the cognitive structures of 
communicative reason, so too the reasoning practices of institutions themselves are 
at risk in change in argument practices. Sometimes change is good even necessary, 
for it is not the case that Aristotle’s equilibrium benefits everyone equally or 
distributes risks of error fairly. 
 
5.5 Networking argumentation 
 
Moral hazard is not merely a problem attached to personal or professional life. 
Moral hazard is also attached to media that disguise risk by circulating 
controversies by leaps in pace, scope, and scale. Informal logic and critical thinking 
are projects address well the habits of a mass media age saturated with militaristic 
propaganda and consumer advertising. The mass media is still with us, of course. 
The question remains open: what are the possibilities for great achievement and the 
mutation of fallacious reasoning and poor thinking given network of exchange 
afforded by new, participatory media platforms? Mapping global controversies at 
MIT finds the internet and sentiment to be most analogous to weather formations, 
unpredictable and shifting, sunny and mild or cloudy and stormy.  
 
Vico believed that rhetoric changes with time, the problems of one era are 
not those of another. Critical argumentation studies describe, reflect upon, and 
intervene into trajectories of argument of the past in order to extrapolate 
understanding into emergent contemporary and to interpolate alternative 
possibilities into future development. In Homer’s time, Odysseus wakes up on a 
foreign beach and asks a stranger: Am I talking to human or god? In the twenty first 
century, we pop up our screen and wonder: Am I arguing with a human agent or 
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